Pillar weights
Reasoning for the current 15/20/20/15/15/15 weights, discussion of alternatives, and rules for changing weights in the future.
Pillar weights — reasoning
Current weights (v0.1)
| Pillar | Weight | Note |
|---|---|---|
electoral |
15 % | Electoral process and pluralism |
governance |
20 % | Separation of powers, legislative quality |
judicial |
20 % | Judicial independence, rule of law |
media |
15 % | Media freedom and plurality |
civil |
15 % | Civil liberties |
corruption |
15 % | Corruption and transparency |
Sum = 100 %.
Status: v0.1 draft (2026-04-28). Requires review.
The weighting principle
Weights are a normative choice. This document explains why these particular values, not which value is objectively correct — no such value exists.
Considerations that drove the weights:
- Empirical backsliding literature. Studies of democratic backsliding (Bermeo 2016, Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018, V-Dem reports 2020+) repeatedly identify attacks on judicial independence and on the quality of the legislative process as the most common and most effective channels of erosion. That is why
judicialandgovernanceget a slightly higher weight (20 % each). - Detectability between annual updates. The project’s goal is timely detection of directional change.
electoralchanges rarely (Chamber-of-Deputies elections every 4 years);mediaandcorruptionare tracked continuously. Higher event frequency in a pillar does not mean higher weight — that would distort the score. So frequency alone does not affect the weight. - Independence of dimensions. The pillars are designed to be as independent as possible (see
pillars.md, section on overlap). Equal weights match the hypothesis that they are comparably important; the differentiated 15/20 reflects empirical evidence that some are channels of faster backsliding.
Discussion of alternatives
A) Equal weights (16.67 % each)
Pro: Simple, no subjective input, easy to defend as "neutral". V-Dem uses equal weights in some sub-indices.
Con: It implicitly says, for example, that full removal of judicial independence weighs the same as a local media incident of similar severity. Empirically this isn’t how democracies die.
Conclusion: Rejected, but equal weights are a useful control calculation — the index should also be displayed in this variant on the methodology page for transparency.
B) judicial and governance at 25 % each (the remaining 50 % distributed equally)
Pro: Stronger emphasis on structural dimensions, more consistent with the literature.
Con: Marginalises civil and media, which are very live in the Czech context (media concentration, minority protection). Risk that important trends in these areas disappear in the overall score.
Conclusion: Rejected as too aggressive. If validation shows that judicial + governance correlate with EIU/V-Dem more than other pillars, v0.2 could move towards 22.5/22.5.
C) Dynamic weights (context-dependent)
Pro: Adaptive to the situation.
Con: Destroys comparability over time. Backtesting stops making sense. Opens up vast room for motivated manipulation ("in this situation we’re weighting the judiciary higher because…").
Conclusion: Permanently rejected. Weights must be fixed within a version of the methodology.
Rules for changing weights
- Changing weights = a new methodology version (v0.1 → v0.2). It’s not a fix, it’s a revision.
- Every change requires:
- A commit to
weights.mdandCHANGELOG.mdwith explicit reasoning. - Recomputation of the entire historical score series with the new weights and storage of both series (v0.x and v0.y) in
data/scores/. The old version doesn’t disappear. - The change marked in the dashboard.
- A commit to
- A change can only be proposed:
- After quarterly validation (see
methodology/validation_YYYY-Qx.md), if the index persistently and systematically diverges from EIU/V-Dem by > 10 points in a direction that cannot be explained by current events. - After a substantial methodology change at one of the primary sources (V-Dem fundamentally re-computes EDI, EIU changes sub-categories).
- After quarterly validation (see
- Weights can never be changed in response to a specific political outcome (election, crisis) — that would be a clear signal of motivated adjustment.